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In Lee et al. (2020), we showed using a large speed dating study that sex differences 
in misperceptions of sexual interest can be explained by sociosexual orientation and, 
primarily, the tendency to project one’s own interest onto others. We suggested that our 
results called into question the influential theory that the sex difference in misperception of 
sexual interest evolved via sex-specific specialized adaptations because it is advantageous for 
men, relative to women, to overperceive sexual interest (error management theory; EMT). 
Roth, Samara, and Kret (2020) criticise our interpretation, claiming that 1) our analyses are 
confounded and 2) we have confused proximate and ultimate levels of explanation. We reject 
both claims, but the second is an interesting and important issue that has arisen repeatedly in 
discussions of our paper, as well as in other contexts in the broader literature on evolution 
and human behaviour. We spend some time discussing why proximate explanations are 
crucial to a healthy evolutionary psychology, and why we believe evolutionary psychologists 
should pay more attention to them.  
First, though, we address Roth et al.’s claim that “It is not surprising that sex 
differences in the overperception bias disappeared when adding these mediating variables, 
as the sex differences in the mediators are confounding their main analysis.” Roth et al. 
marshal evidence, both from the literature and their analysis of our own data, that our 
mediators 
(sociosexuality and own sexual interest) differ by sex, as if this is new information 
devastating to our argument. But the entire rationale of our study relies on these well-
established sex differences, which we explained at length in the Introduction of Lee et al. 
(2020; p 185). For mediation to exist, the mediator must be associated with both the 
independent variable (sex) and the dependent variable (misperception of sexual interest) 
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(Baron and Kenny 1986). In other words, for mediation to exist, the mediator variables must 
differ by sex. It therefore does not make sense to claim, as Roth et al. do, that sex differences 
in the mediators confounded our analyses.  
We also note that we did not “cast doubt on the validity of previously described sex 
differences in sexual overperception bias”, as Roth et al. claim. Indeed, we showed the same 
overperception bias in our own data (see Base Model effect for Sex, Figure 1). Roth et al. 
also call our conclusion that the sex difference in misperception of sexual interest disappears 
when the mediators are controlled for “unwarranted” and “not justified”. This effect is simply 
an empirical observation, not our conclusion.  
 
The proximate-ultimate distinction should not be used to shield ultimate explanations from 
scrutiny 
With regard to the proximate-ultimate distinction (Tinbergen 1963), there are two 
common kinds of erroneous thinking in the evolutionary social sciences. One kind is well 
recognised: the mistake of conflating proximate and ultimate levels of explanation (see Scott-
Phillips et al. 2011for discussion and examples). This is the mistake Roth et al. suggest we 
made in Lee et al. (2020), even though we discussed this very issue (p. 190). The second kind 
is perhaps more pernicious because it is not well recognised: the mistaken belief that ultimate 
explanations have nothing to say about proximate mechanisms, and vice versa. This is the 
error that Roth et al. make. They say: “EMT is primarily concerned with the ultimate causes 
of behavior, and remains ‘virtually silent’ about the proximate causes (Haselton & Galperin, 
2013, p. 249)”. But just because researchers proposing an ultimate explanation do not specify 
a proximate explanation, it does not follow that the nature of the proximate explanation has 
no implications for the ultimate explanation. On the contrary, the proximate explanation can 
represent strong (or weak) evidence for or against a given ultimate explanation.  
 
 
The illustrative example Roth et al. use of a proximate explanation (testosterone 
correlating with singing in birds) happens to be perfectly consistent with the ultimate 
explanation (birds sing to attract mates). This is because 1) there tends to be more 
competition for mates among males, 2) males tend to sing more than females, and 3) making 
a trait dependent on sex hormone levels is the primary way evolution creates adaptive sexual 
dimorphism. But the fact that this particular proximate explanation is consistent with this 
particular ultimate explanation does not mean that any proximate explanation is consistent 
with any ultimate explanation.  
Imagine, for example, that Researcher A hypothesises that humans should tend to be 
scared of snakes because of an evolutionary history in which snakes often killed people, 
meaning fear of snakes provided a fitness advantage. She performs a study showing that 
people do indeed tend to fear snakes. Researcher A concludes that her research supports the 
ultimate explanation on which the hypothesis was based. Researcher B challenges this 
conclusion by raising the possible proximate explanation that people learn to fear snakes in 
the course of their lives. Researcher A replies that B has made a classic proximate-ultimate 
confusion: associative learning is the proximate explanation, which says nothing about the 
ultimate explanation (an evolutionary history in which snakes often killed people).  
We hope the problems with Researcher A’s claims are obvious in this example. 
Learning is a general process not specific to snakes. Therefore, if learning is required to fear 
snakes, there need not be any special ultimate explanation required for fear of snakes. On the 
other hand, if fear of snakes emerges in a manner beyond what can be explained by general 
learning principles, such as it being present from birth or being more easily learned than fear 
of other animals or objects, then we might invoke an ultimate explanation. In reality, the 
question of whether an ultimate explanation for fear of snakes is necessary is still being 
debated a half-century after the hypothesis was proposed (Seligman 1971), and the grist of 
 
 
the debate includes, to a large degree, the details of the proximate mechanisms of fear of 
snakes (Coelho et al. 2019). 
As well as providing a useful illustration of why proximate explanations matter for 
ultimate explanations, the above example also provides a loose analogy to the findings of Lee 
et al. (2020). We found that projection – an individuals’ tendency to project their own sexual 
interest onto their speed-date partners – almost fully (98%) mediated the sex difference in 
over-perception of sexual interest. Does projection make sense as a proximate mechanism for 
the ultimate explanation provided by error management theory (that sex differences in over-
perceptions of sexual interest have evolved as a specialized adaptation to sex-specific 
selection pressures)? Inconsistent with that possibility is the fact that the tendency to believe 
others feel similarly to oneself is a general phenomenon not specific to sexual attraction 
(Marks and Miller 1987; as we note in Lee et al. 2020), just as learning is a general process 
not specific to snakes. Because men tend to have greater sexual interest in opposite-sex 
strangers than do women (a sex difference that has its own distinct ultimate explanation, just 
as learning has its own ultimate explanation), and because people tend to believe others feel 
similarly to themselves (a general phenomenon for which the ultimate explanation is 
unclear), sex differences can be predicted to emerge in the over-perception of sexual interest 
without the need for a specific ultimate explanation.  
Even if projection were not a general phenomenon and were instead limited to sexual 
interest, would it make sense as a proximate mechanism for error management theory? This 
depends on the specification of the theory. As it was formulated with regard to misperception 
of sexual interest (Haselton and Buss 2000), error management theory identifies the ultimate 
source of sexual misperception as the difference between male and female costs and benefits 
of over- and under-perception (the evolutionary logic of these male-female differences is 
based on parental investment theory, which ultimately derives from the different cost of male 
 
 
and female gametes (Trivers 1972; Haselton 2003)). Haselton and Buss’s formulation does 
not invoke a role for one’s own sexual interest, so it provides no reason to predict evolution 
would have created a sex difference in sexual misperception via the needlessly complex route 
of evolving a psychological mechanism that links bias towards sexual overperception with 
individuals’ own sexual interest. In fact, Haselton and Buss (2000) explicitly contrast error 
management theory with “the default-model hypothesis, which is closely related to the false 
consensus model in social-cognitive research (see Marks & Miller, 1987, for a review). This 
hypothesis suggests that men exceed women in sexual desire and use their own desires as an 
erroneous gauge of women's desires (Shotland and Craig 1988)” (p. 82). That is, Haselton 
and Buss regarded projection as an alternative to error management theory, not as its 
potential mechanism.  
To be properly falsifiable and therefore useful, ultimate explanations must 
meaningfully connect with data – not only endpoint observations like men overperceiving 
sexual interest or people fearing snakes, but the proximate mechanisms by which such effects 
arise. But there seems to be a belief common among evolutionary psychologists that our 
domain of interest is ultimate explanations and that proximate explanations are the concern of 
others. This belief does our ultimate explanations a huge disservice. Not only does it mean 
that we often dismiss information that points to a disconnect between theory and data (as 
Roth et al. do), which stymies the correction and refinement of ultimate explanations – worse, 
the belief tends to prevent us from looking for this information in the first place. Disinterest 
in proximate explanations may partly explain why genetics, the quintessential proximate 
explanation, has played so limited a role in evolutionary psychology despite underlying to 
varying extents all the behaviours we are interested in. Behavioural genetics findings can 
create considerable problems for existing ultimate explanations (e.g. Zietsch and Santtila 
2011; Lee et al. 2014; Zietsch 2016; Sherlock and Zietsch 2017; Zietsch and Sidari 2019). 
 
 
Ignoring these findings does not protect ultimate explanations, it only shields them from 
scrutiny – and it closes off opportunities for strengthening the explanations and developing 
new ones (see Zietsch et al. 2015 for a review). The same applies to non-genetic study of 
other proximate explanations.  
To conclude, we argue that Roth et al.’s commentary reflects a costly tendency among 
evolutionary psychologists to ignore or dismiss proximate explanations as irrelevant to the 
ultimate explanations of real interest. We call on evolutionary psychologists to devote more 
attention and study to proximate explanations of behaviour, and to look for evidence relating 
to proximate mechanisms that might support or disconfirm ultimate explanations. Although 
there will rarely be a one-to-one link across these levels of understanding, uniting proximate 
and ultimate explanations will only strengthen the field.  
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